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In this paper, a fault detection anddiagnosis (FDD) scheme is developed for a class of intensiedHEX/reactor, inwhich faults caused
by sensor, actuator, and process are taken into account in the unied framework. By considering overall heat transfer coecient
as a function of fouling and uid ow rate, a dynamic model which is capable of identifying these two faults simultaneously is
derived. Sensormeasurements, together with estimation by adaptive high gain observers, are processed, aimed at identifying sensor
faults and providing adequate estimation to substitute faulty measurements.
en reliable measurements are fed to several banks of
interval lters to generate several banks of residuals; each bank of residuals is sensitive to a particular process parameter/actuator.
By evaluating these residuals, process/actuator fault isolation and identication are achieved. 
e proposed strategy is applied to
actual data retrieved from a new intensied heat exchanger reactor. Simulation results conrm the applicability and robustness of
the proposed methodology.
1. Introduction
In order to meet the increasing needs for safer operating
condition and lower waste in terms of cost and energy in the
chemical engineering eld, multifunctional devices, such as
intensied continuous heat exchangers (HEX)/reactors [1],
are a promisingway.
e prospects of intensied technologies
are a drastic reduction of unit size and solvent consumption
while safety is increased due to their remarkable heat transfer
capabilities. However, important barriers such as potential
risk of thermal runaway exist in such intensied process [2].
Moreover, several kinds of failures may compromise safety
and productivity linked to actuator, process, and sensor.
Advanced fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) can help
in accurately monitoring process variables and interpreting
their behaviors, thus providing better predictivemaintenance
aids.

ere have been a large number of results related to FDD
in chemical process. 
ey are mainly divided into model-
based [3, 4] and data-based approaches [5–7]. Model-based
method uses deviations between the measured value and the
reference value as an indicator to raise alarm about faults
and take action on timely fault diagnosis and correction.

e process under consideration in this work has already
been studied and modelled several times by the scientic
communities. Most studies mainly focus on detailed
mathematical models of the physics, aimed at developing
reliable and accurate models to predict both the thermal
performance and conversion of the process, like nonlinear
models derived in [8–10]. Other studies contribute from
perspective of engineering control. In [11], a control system
is developed and an extended Kalman lter is designed to
estimate the unmeasured parameters. An optimization and
control approach is presented in [12]. To authors’ knowledge,
existing results do not oer a suitable dynamic model of the
typical faults which can be encountered and concerned with
the application of FDD for HEX/reactor.
ese two problems
constitute the main motivation of this work.
Model-based diagnosis methods would be more e-
ciently and relatively applied if a dynamicmodel of the system
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Figure 1: Pilot HEX/reactor.
is available to evaluate the consequences of deviations and
the eciency of the proposed safety barriers. Developments
of dynamic models for HEX and continuous reactor have
received considerable attention. 
e lumped model, also
called cell-based model in the literature, is very oen used,
by which each cell is modelled by means of the energy
and mass balances; see, for example, [13–18]. Among these
models, the heat transfer coecient will be assumed either
constant or slowly decreasing. Many authors working in
the eld of process control and controllability prefer the
constant parameter because of the computational simplicity,
and a simplied dynamic model containing only one cell is
oen the case on application of fault detection and isolation,
like sensor and/or actuator fault detection and isolation
methods proposed in [19–22]. However, it is widely accepted
that fouling inuences the dynamics of overall heat transfer
coecient; thus constant value leads to some mismatch
between the model and physical process, and this mismatch
is usually handled as unstructured model uncertainties,
like in [19]. In order to better minimize the mismatch,
fouling inuence was developed by considering heat transfer
coecient is slowly decreasing. To compute fouling, online
updating rules based on observers are widely investigated,
like extended Kalman lter (EKF) in [23], adaptive high
gain observer in [24], and recursive least-squares method in
[17]. Another popular method is to calculate the parameter
oine, as proposed in [19]. Several fault diagnosis (FD)
approaches have been proposed with parameter regularly
updated; for this purpose, H∞ approach in [25], adaptive
observer in [26, 27], polynomial fuzzy observer in [28], and
EKF in [29] are mostly used. 
ese assumptions work well
during normal conditions. However, eect of decreasing the
overall heat transfer coecient should be limited to a normal
range with respect to specic engineering process. If the
system dierence greatly exceeds this normal range, a fault
is considered. For instance, on occasion that valve clogging
causes sudden stop of mass ow rate or higher fouling results
in insulating the heat transfer surface due to big pieces
of settled material, both situations will cause damage and
are considered as most dangerous situations in [2]. When
these happen, positive jumps will emerge in the heat transfer
coecient, whose eect may denitely exceed the normal
rang. Few works formulate a model capable of identifying
these two faults simultaneously.

e primary objective of this work is to propose dynamic
model suitable for diagnostic requirements on the studied
HEX/reactor, and this model is capable of guaranteeing the
model validity by accounting the inuence of the mass ow
rate and fouling on overall heat transfer coecient. While
the other major contribution lies on that, we propose an
integrated FDD approach that aims at detecting, isolating,
and identifying faults that aected sensor, actuator, and
process parameters simultaneously. Once a fault occurs, it
is detected immediately and then the isolation procedure
is triggered. We rst identify whether fault is caused by
temperature sensors malfunction; the sensor FDD strategy
is based on a bank of adaptive high gain observers with
two main purposes. 
e rst one is to generate robust
residuals for recognizing faulty sensor when faults occur.
e
second purpose is to act as a soware sensor to provide an
adequate estimation of the process outputs, thus replacing
the measurement given by faulty physical sensors. In order
to achieve process and actuator FDD, healthy measurements
are tackled with several banks of parameter interval lters to
generate several banks of residuals; each bank of residuals
aims at identifying fault in one particular process param-
eter/actuator. Process parameter fault refers to sharp jump
in overall heat transfer coecient which may be caused
by higher fouling or abrupt change of uid ow rate; the
diagnostic observers are designed to generate residuals which
are only sensitive to fouling while being robust to mass ow
rate. Abrupt change of mass ow rate is treated as actuator
fault. Pneumatic control valves are used to control input of
ow rate of both process uid and utility uid in this work;
unexpected changes of the ow rate of both uids, due to
leakage, stiction, and so on, are then recognized as actuator
faults.

e rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section,
model of the HEX/reactor and the faults are presented.
Proposed FDD scheme is given in Section 3, including
sensor FDD and recovery strategy, process, and actuator
FDD. 
ereaer in Section 4, the proposed algorithms are
illustrated on simulation. Finally, conclusion is given in the
last section.
2. Intensified HEX/Reactor
Fault diagnosis will be presented and applied to a pilot heat
exchanger depicted in Figure 1 and characterized in [30].
As show in Figure 1, the pilot has been manufactured in
accordance with the results of the geometry optimization.
It consists in three reactive plates sandwiched between four
utility plates. 
e reactive plates as well as the utility plates
have been engraved by laser machining to obtain 2 mm
square cross-section channels. 
is section describes the
dynamic nonlinear model of the HEX/reactor. 
is model is
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Figure 2:푁 cell models.
calibrated by means of references steady state condition data
of the pilot HEX/reactor.
2.1. Cell-Based Intensied HEX/Reactor Model. One of the
key issues inmodelling for fault detection and isolation is how
to accommodate the level of detail of the model description
to suit the diagnostic requirements. From view point of heat
exchange performance, behavior of intensied HEX/reactor
can be assimilated to a compact heat exchanger to derive a
dynamic model. We follow the work of [8, 18] to derive the
cell-based dynamicmodel.
e heat exchanger is modelled as푁 ideally mixed interconnected tanks in cell-based models,
as shown in Figure 2.

e modelling of a cell is based on the mass and energy
balances which describe the evolution of the characteristic
values: temperature, mass, composition, and so forth. Several
assumptions should be fullled; see [18]. It is assumed
that the liquid volume in each tank is constant. Each cell
is perfectly homogenous, and no back mixing occurred.
Both uids are liquid with constant densities, heat transfer
to the surrounding is negligible, and there is no energy
accumulation in the wall. 
us, the application of the energy
balance rule considering a single cell per uid (covering
the whole length) to a counter ow HEX/reactor gives rise
to the dynamical models; each cell consists of two perfect
stirred tanks with inows and outows. In order to suit the
diagnostic requirements better, there are two problemswhich
need to be taken into consideration. One is with respect to the
dynamics of the heat transfer coecient. Another problem is
the determination of the cell number 푁. It is accepted that
large number of cells could keep dynamics better, but may
lead to high computational loads.
A drawback of the studied technologies is that the appara-
tus cannot open for cleaning and therefore fouling, which can
cause gradual decline in the performance of HEX/reactors,
which will limit its application [1].
erefore it is necessary to
monitor dynamics of fouling. 
is is solved by considering
the inuence of both mass ow rate and fouling dynamics
on the heat transfer coecient. Specically, the heat transfer
coecient (푈) is calculated by the convective heat transfer
coecient of the process uid side and utility uid side and
is generally dened by 1/푈 = 1/ℎ푝 +1/ℎ푢 +푅푓. ℎ푝, ℎ푢 denote
the convection heat transfer coecients for the process
and utility uid, and 푅푓 denotes the thermal resistance or
fouling parameter. For both sides of the heat exchanger
used here, assuming that the heat transfer coecient is a
function of mass ow, the convection coecients are ℎ푝(푡) =퐾푝퐹푦푝 , ℎ푢(푡) = 퐾푢퐹푦푢 , where퐾푝, 퐾푢 are constants. Neglecting
the thermal resistance (e.g., for a clean exchanger), this leads
to 푈 (푡) = ℎ푝 (푡) ℎ푢 (푡)ℎ푝 (푡) + ℎ푢 (푡) = 퐾푝퐾푢 (퐹푝 (푡) 퐹푢 (푡))푦(퐾푝퐹푦푝 (푡) + 퐾푢퐹푦푢 (푡))= 퐾푈 (퐹푝퐹푢)푦(퐹푝)푦 + 푒 (퐹푢)푦 ,
(1)
where 푒 and 푦 are constants. As the overall heat transfer
coecient decreases with fouling, we can assume that fouling
can be characterized by the parameter 퐾푈. 
en the overall
heat transfer coecient at the reference mass ow rate 퐹∗푝 , 퐹∗푢
can be expressed as 푈∗(푡) = 퐾푈((퐹∗푃퐹∗푢 )푦/((퐹∗푃 )푦 + 푒(퐹∗푢 )푦)).
To account for variations in themass ow rate, dene 훼, 훽
as fouling parameters and 훾 as a function of mass ow rates;
then we get훼 = 푈∗퐴푉푝 ,훽 = 푈∗퐴푉푢 ,훾 = 푈푈∗ = (퐹푝퐹푢)푦 ((퐹∗푃)푦 + 푒 (퐹∗푢 )푦)(퐹∗푃퐹∗푢 )푦 ((퐹푝)푦 + 푒 (퐹푢)푦) .
(2)

us, by letting the overall heat transfer coecient be
function of mass ow and fouling, a process model is
then obtained which is capable of accurately describing the
dynamics of the heat exchanger for a wide range of working
conditions:푇̇푘푝 = 1휌푝푐푝푝훼훾 (푇푘푢 − 푇푘푝) + 1푉푝 (푇푖푛푝 − 푇푘푝) 퐹푝푇̇푘푢 = 1휌푢푐푝푢훽훾 (푇푘푝 − 푇푘푢) + 1푉푢 (푇푘+1푢 − 푇푘푢) 퐹푢 푘 = 1
(3a)
푇̇푘푝 = 1휌푝푐푝푝훼훾 (푇푘푢 − 푇푘푝) + 1푉푝 (푇푘−1푝 − 푇푘푝) 퐹푝푇̇푘푢 = 1휌푢푐푝푢훽훾 (푇푘푝 − 푇푘푢) + 1푉푢 (푇푘+1푢 − 푇푘푢) 퐹푢1 < 푘 < 푁
(3b)
푇̇푘푝 = 1휌푝푐푝푝훼훾 (푇푘푢 − 푇푘푝) + 1푉푝 (푇푘−1푝 − 푇푘푝) 퐹푝푇̇푘푢 = 1휌푢푐푝푢훽훾 (푇푘푝 − 푇푘푢) + 1푉푢 (푇푖푛푢 − 푇푘푢) 퐹푢 푘 = 푁,
(3c)
where 휌푝, 휌푢 are density of the process uid and utility uid
(in kg⋅m−3);푉푝, 푉푢 are volumes of the process uid and utility
4 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
Temperature T_process
1 cell
3 cells
5 cells
10 cells
20 cells
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
T
em
p
er
at
u
re
 (
∘ C
)
50 100 150 2000
Time (s)
Figure 3: Temperature variation for the HEX/reactor divided into
dierent cells.
uid (in m3); 푐푝푝, 푐푝푢 are specic heat of the process uid
and utility uid (in J⋅kg−1⋅K−1); 푈 is the overall heat transfer
coecient (in J⋅m−2⋅K−1⋅s−1). A is the heat transfer area (in
m2).퐹푝, 퐹푢 aremass ow rates of process uid and utility uid
(in kg⋅s−1). 푇푘−1푝 is the process uid temperature of previous
cell. For the cell 1, it is the inlet temperature of process uid푇푖푛푝 . 푇푘+1푢 is the utility uid temperature of previous cell. For
the cell 푁, it is the inlet temperature of utility uid 푇푖푛푢 . To
summarize, detection of fouling will be linked to variations
of parameters 훼, 훽 in real time, while determination of jumps
in ow rate is associated with 훾.
As mentioned above, in this paper, we mainly focus
on the heat exchange performance. A trade-o between
accuracy and computation load is necessary to determine
the minimum number of cells. 
e FDD procedure requires
the process to operate in steady state; several simulations are
made to determine the minimal number of cells in steady
state by considering the HEX/reactor divided into a variable
number of cells; in particular, the results refer to dierent
cells: 1, 3, 5, 10, and 20 cells, respectively. 
e test conditions
are 푇푝푖 = 76∘C, 푇푢푖 = 15.6∘C, 퐹푢 = 152 kg/h,퐹푝 = 15 kg/h.
More detailed information can be found in [30]. As shown
in Figure 3, the temperature of process uid varies obviously
between 1-cell case and multicell case. While there is no big
dierences among multicell cases, simulation results seem to
be quite insensitive to the increase of the number of cells.

us, the dynamics do not dier much from 3 cells, and
the temperature varies less and less with the increase in the
number of cells.
2.2. Cell-Based Diagnostic Dynamic Model. Dene state vec-
tor as 푥 = [푥1, 푥2, 푥3, 푥4, 푥5, 푥6]푇 = [푇1푝, 푇1푢 , 푇2푝, 푇2푢 , 푇3푝, 푇3푢]푇;
the input vector is 푢 = [푢1, 푢2]푇 = [퐹푝, 퐹푢]푇, related param-
eters 휃 = [훼, 훽], and nally 푦 = [푦1, 푦2]푇 = [푇3푝, 푇1푢]푇 is the
vector of the outlet temperature.
Faults in chemical processes can be usually classied in
sensor, actuator, and process faults, linked to temperature
sensors, control valves, and fouling parameter, respectively,
in this work. A sensor fault can be modelled as an unknown
additive term in the output equation, 푦 = 퐶푥 + 푓푠(푡).
Supposed 푦푠푗 is the actual measured output of 푗th sensor;
then if 푗th sensor is fault-free, 푦푠푗 = 푦푗, while if 푗th sensor
is faulty, 푦푠푗 = 푦푓푗 = 푦푗 + 푓푠푗 (푓푠푗 is the fault) for 푡 ≥ 푡푓 and
lim푡→∞|푦푗 − 푦푠푗| ̸= 0. 
at means 푦푓푗 is the actual output of
the 푗th sensor when it is faulty, while푦푗 is the expected output
when it is healthy.
Process fault refers to unexpected variations of a process
parameter. Important fouling is taken into account as process
fault and is modelled by means of a linear combination with
an unknown time-varying parameter vector 휃(푡)푓(푥); 푓(푥)
is a known function which depends on states. 
e eect of
process fault on the system dynamics is taken into account
via an additive term 휃(푡)푓(푥).
An actuator fault occurs when a malfunction of control
valve happens in either uid, and it is modelled as an
unknown additive term, due to unexpected variations of the
input 푢 with respect to its nominal value. When actuator
faults occur, we have 푢푓푗 = 푢푗 + 푓푎푗 = 휃푎푗, for 푡 ≥ 푡푓 and
lim푡→∞|푢푗 − 휃푎푗| ̸= 0, where 푓푎푗 is the fault and 푢푓푗 is the
actual output of the 푗th actuator when it is faulty, while 푢푗
is the expected output when it is healthy.
To sum up, the fault dynamics model can be rewritten as
follows: 푥̇ = 푓 (푥) 휃 (푡) +∑
푗
푔푗 (푥) 푢푗 + 퐹푎푓푎푦 = 퐶푥 + 퐹푠푓푠, (4)
where
푓 (푥, 휃) =( 푓1 (푥, 휃)푓2 (푥, 휃)...푓6 (푥, 휃) ) =
((((((((((((((
(
1휌푝푐푝푝훼훾 (푥2 − 푥1)1휌푢푐푝푢훽훾 (푥1 − 푥2)1휌푝푐푝푝훼훾 (푥4 − 푥3)1휌푢푐푝푢훽훾 (푥3 − 푥4)1휌푝푐푝푝훼훾 (푥6 − 푥5)1휌푢푐푝푢훽훾 (푥5 − 푥6)
))))))))))))))
)
,
푔 (푥) = (푔1 (푥) , 푔2 (푥)) =
((((((((((((((((
(
(푇푖푛푝 − 푥1)푉푝 00 (푥4 − 푥2)푉푢(푥1 − 푥3)푉푝 00 (푥6 − 푥4)푉푢(푥3 − 푥5)푉푝 00 (푇푖푛푢 − 푥6)푉푢
))))))))))))))))
)
(5)
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and the output matrix 퐶 is given by 퐶 = [0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0]; 퐹푎
and 퐹푠 are the fault distribution matrixes and we consider
that the fault vectors 푓푎, 푓푠 are limited signals where ‖푓푎‖ ≤푀푎, ‖푓푠‖ ≤ 푀푠 (푀푎 and푀푠 are positive known constants).

e above model includes the case in which multisensor,
multiprocess, and/or actuator faults occur during the same
operation. However, in the case that dierent sensors are
subject to failures, at least one sensor should remain healthy;
otherwise, faults can only be detected but not correctly
isolated and identied.
3. Proposed FDD Scheme
3.1. General Description of Proposed FDD Scheme. 
e aim
of this paper is to propose a model-based FDD strategy for
solving the FDDchallenges in an intensiedHEX/reactor.We
focus on fault isolation and identication. For fault detection,
a nominal observer proposed in [3] is used. We consider the
fault detection is fast enough, so that the time of occurrence
of a fault and the time of beginning of isolation are the same
and denoted by 푡푓.
A major contribution is the development of a framework
in which faults caused by sensors, actuators, and process can
be handled within an integrated approach. Sensor, actuator,
and process parameters refer to uid temperature sensor,
uid control valve, and overall heat transfer coecient,
respectively.

e FDD scheme is triggered by an alarm of fault.
As shown in Figure 4, aer a fault occurs, outputs of so
sensor, together with physical sensor, are processed, aimed
at identifying faulty physical sensor and recovering the
faulty value once physical sensor is faulty. 
e sensor FDD
framework is based on a bank of adaptive high gain observers
with two main purposes: sensor fault isolation and faulty
sensor substitution. Adaptive high gain observers are adopted
since they can simultaneously estimate both states and
time-varying parameters, thus guaranteeing a more accurate
approximation of the process. 
e number of observers
is equal to the number of outputs (sensors). In order to
achieve process and actuator FDD, healthymeasurements are
then processed to generate banks of residuals via parameter
interval lters, aimed at recognizing process/actuator faults;
the number of banks of lters is equal to the number of
process parameters and actuators.
3.2. Sensor FDD and Fault Recovery. We rst recognize
sensor fault, so as to provide reliable measure/estimated
value for next step of process and actuator fault FDD. We
consider that the system is subject to parameter uncertainties
which refer to the incipient time-varying overall heat transfer
coecient in the intensied HEX/reactor. 
e strategy to
handle this uncertainty is to take into consideration this
variation in the design of observers. More specically, the
parameter uncertainty is expressed by a new state of the
observer. In order to achieve the goal, we employ and extend
observer proposed in [18, 31] for parameter online tuning,
thus guaranteeing more accurate dynamics of the process.
3.2.1. Observer Formulation and Fault Isolation. By extending
the time-varying parameter vector 휃 = [훼 훽] as new state,
model (4) can be rewritten as푥̇ (푡) = 푓 (푥 (푡)) 휃 (푡) + ∑
푗
푔푗 (푥 (푡)) 푢푗 (푡)̇휃 (푡) = 휀 (푡)푦 (푡) = 퐶푥 (푡) + 퐹푠푓푠, (6)
where 휀(푡) is an unknown but bounded function which may
depend on 푥, 푢, noise, and so forth.

e proposed sensor FDD framework is based on a bank
of observers; the number of observers is equal to the number
of sensors. Each observer uses only one sensor output to
estimate all the states and parameters. Assumptions related to
boundedness of the states, signals, functions, and so on given
in [18, 31] are satised. Let 푦푖 denote the 푖th system output
used by the 푖th observer. 
en we can form 푛 observers for 푛
sensors aṡ̂푥푖 = 푓 (푥̂푖 (푡)) 휃̂푖 (푡) + ∑
푗
푔푗 (푥̂푖 (푡)) 푢푗+ 푆−1휃푖 퐶푇 (푦̂푖푖−푦푖)
6 Journal of Control Science and Engineerinġ̂휃푖 (푡) = −푆−1휃푖 퐶푇푓 (푥̂푖 (푡))−1 (푦̂푖푖−푦푖)푦̂푖 = 퐶푥̂푖 (푡) 푖 = 1, 2,
(7)
where 푖 denotes the 푖th observer, 푦̂푖푖 denotes the 푖th estimated
system output generated by the 푖th observer, and 푆휃푖 is a sym-
metric positive-denite matrix which satises the algebraic
Lyapunov equation:휅푖푆휃푖 + 퐴푇푆휃푖퐴 − 퐶퐶푇 = 0, (8)
where 휅푖 > 0 is the tuning parameter of the observer and 퐴 is
an identity matrix.
In the absence of uncertainties and sensor noise, there
exists a set of observer gains such that the state estimation
error 푒푖푥 = 푥̂푖 − 푥 of the observer (7) is globally uniformly
convergent to 0 as 푡 → ∞. Moreover, the convergence is
exponential.
Dene 푒푖푥 = 푥̂푖 − 푥,푒푖푦 = 퐶푒푖푥,푒푖푦푗 = 푦̂푖푗 − 푦푗푟푖푗 (푡) = 푑 儩儩儩儩儩푒푖푦푗儩儩儩儩儩푑푡 = 푑 儩儩儩儩儩푦̂푖푗 − 푦푗儩儩儩儩儩푑푡휇푖 = 儩儩儩儩儩푟푖푗 (푡)儩儩儩儩儩 fl sup 儩儩儩儩儩푟푖푗 (푡)儩儩儩儩儩 푡 ≥ 0.
(9)
A fault is isolated when the norm of the residual vector 푟푖푖(푡)
exceeds the suitably dened threshold 휇푖.
3.2.2. Fault Recovery. Asmentioned above, the extendedhigh
gain observer is also used as a soware sensor to provide an
adequate estimation of the process output, thus replacing the
measurement given by faulty physical sensor.
Let 푦푠푖 be the actual measured output from 푖th sensor;
then if residual corresponding to the 푖th sensor does not
exceed its threshold, let the signal given by the physical sensor
be the output. However, if the threshold is exceeded, then let푦̂푖푗 replace 푦푠푖 where 푦̂푖푗 is the estimation of the 푖th system
output given by the 푗th observer. 
at is,
푦푖 = {{{푦푠푖, if 푖th sensor healthy푦̂푖푗, if 푖th sensor faulty. (10)
3.3. Actuator/Process Fault Diagnosis
3.3.1. Gain Interval Filter Formulation and Fault Isolation. In
order to achieve process FDD, healthy measurements are fed
to푝 banks of extended parameter interval lters developed as
in [4] to generate 푝 banks of residuals. 푝 is corresponding to
the total number of process parameters and actuators. 
ese
residuals are processed for identifying unexpected changes of
parameter and/or actuators.
In order to fast locate the faulty value, the practical
domain of the value of each system parameter/actuator is
divided into a certain number of intervals, and a bank
of parameter interval lters is formed and based on these
intervals. 
ese interval lters are designed to be “less”
insensitive to a particular parameter/actuator and sensitive
to the other ones. Aer verifying all the intervals, whether
or not one of them contains the faulty parameter value of
the system, the faulty parameter value is declared. 
e fault
is therefore isolated and estimated. We extended the interval
determining method proposed in [4] by dividing the bound
of each interval according to percentage changes of nominal
value, rather than according to specic value of a parameter.
By doing so, we not only benet frommore clear relationship
between faulty value and nominal value but also decrease the
complexity in observer design. Like control valve in thiswork,
dierent control valves have dierent nominal values, but all
these control valves could share the same interval lters, so
we do not need to design lters for each control valve.
More specically, as in (4), we denote all parameters and
actuators that are with the possibilities of fault occurrences
by 휃, 푢1, . . . , 푢푗, . . . , 푢푝. Dene [휃∗, 푢∗1 , 푢∗2 , . . . , 푢∗푗 , . . . , 푢∗푝] as
the desired nominal value for these parameters and actu-
ators. And dene [휇0, 휇1, 휇2, . . . , 휇푗, . . . , 휇푝] as gain indi-
cator representing a gain fault which can be continuous
time-varying or abrupt. 
e case in which 휇푗 = 1
implies that the actuator/parameter is fault-free; 휇푗 = 0
is the case in which the 푖th actuator is in a stuck fault
mode; 0 < 휇푗 < 1 or 휇푗 > 1 corresponds to the
case in which the 푖th actuator partially loses eectiveness.
Besides, 휇0 < 1 means higher fouling degree. 
en[휃∗ × 휇0 푢∗1 × 휇1 푢∗2 × 휇2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푢∗푗 × 휇푗 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푢∗푝 × 휇푝] is the
fault function.
rough evaluating variations of 휇푗, gain fault
of an actuator/parameter is determined.
According to practical engineering situation, the gain
of each parameter is divided into a certain number of
intervals. For example, gain 휇푗 of parameter 푢푗 is par-
titioned into 푞 intervals; their bounds are denoted by휇(0)푗 , 휇(1)푗 , . . . , 휇(푖)푗 , . . . , 휇(푞)푗 .
e bounds of 푖th interval are휇(푖−1)푗
and 휇(푖)푗 and are also denoted by 휇푏푖푗 and 휇푎푖푗 ; the nominal
bound values are 휇0푏푖푗 and 휇0푎푖푗 . To verify if an interval
contains the faulty parameter value of the postfault system, a
parameter lter is built for this interval, which consists of two
isolation observers corresponding to two interval bounds,
and each isolation observer serves two neighboring intervals.
In order to illustrate the proposed method, we discuss 푖th
interval of 푗th actuator. Consideringmodel (4), the parameter
lter for 푖th interval [휇푎푖푗 , 휇푏푖푗 ] of 푢푗 is given below:̇̂푥푎푖푗 = 푓 (푥̂푎푖푗 ) 휃∗ +∑
푙 ̸=푗
푔푙 (푥̂푎푖푗 ) 푢∗푙 + 푔푗 (푥̂푎푖푗 ) 푢∗푗 휇0푎푖푗+ 퐻(푦푗 − 푦̂푎푖푗 )푦̂푎푖푗 = 푐푥̂푎푖푗휀푎푖푗 = 푦 − 푐푥̂푎푖푗
(11)
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Table 1: Physical data used in the pilot.
Constant Description Value Units퐴 Heat transfer area 4푒−6 m3푉푝 Process uid volume 2.685푒−5 m3푉푢 Utility uid volume 1.141푒−4 m3휌푝, 휌푢 Fluid density 1000 kg⋅m−3푐푝푝, 푐푝푢 Specic heat of the uid 4180 J⋅kg−1⋅k−1
̇̂푥푏푖푗 = 푓 (푥̂푏푖푗 ) 휃∗ +∑
푙 ̸=푗
푔푙 (푥̂푏푖푗 ) 푢∗푙 + 푔푗 (푥̂푎푖푗 ) 푢∗푗 휇0푏푖푗+ 퐻(푦푗 − 푦̂푏푖푗 )푦̂푏푖푗 = 푐푥̂푏푖푗휀푏푖푗 = 푦 − 푐푥̂푏푖푗 ,
(12)
where 휇0푎푖푗 (푡) = {{{1, 푡 < 푡푓휇(푖)푗 , 푡 ≥ 푡푓휇0푏푖푗 (푡) = {{{1, 푡 < 푡푓휇(푖−1)푗 , 푡 ≥ 푡푓.
(13)
For the interval [휇푎푖푗 , 휇푏푖푗 ], if it does not contain the faulty
value of the postfault system, then the isolation index V푖푗(푡) =
sgn(휀푎푖푗 )sgn(휀푏푖푗 ) will be “1” aer a short transient time aer
occurrence of the fault, while if V푖푗(푡) remains “−1” and
never switches again, it implies that this interval contains
the faulty value. As soon as V푖푗(푡) = 1, the parameter
lter sends a “fault signature” to indicate that this interval
contains the faulty parameter.
en fault isolation for process
parameter/actuator is achieved.
3.3.2. Fault Identication. Aer fault isolation, if the fault is
in the 푖th interval, the estimated variation and faulty value are
calculated by 휇̂푗 = 12 (휇0푎푖푗 + 휇0푏푖푗 ) ,푢̂푗 = 푢∗푗 휇̂푗. (14)
4. Numerical Simulation
Results and Discussion
Acase study has been developed to test the eectiveness of the
proposed approach. All related data are from real experiment
which can be found in [30]. 
e values of normal operating
conditions used in the simulation are given in Section 2 and
Table 1, respectively.
In order to take into account the inuences of the fouling
dynamics and consider a severer situation, a time-varying
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Figure 5: Overall heat transfer coecient (UA) simulation by math
model and estimation by observer.
slowing decrease is considered to evaluate the overall heat
transfer coecient. In [30], it is calculated that the overall
heat transfer coecient is 200W⋅K−1; under the same condi-
tion, calculated and estimated value by the proposed observer
are plotted in Figure 5, solid line is calculated according to
the data acquired in [30], and dash line indicates the value
generated by the designed observer. From Figure 5, we can
see that the proposed UA tracks the real UA perfectly, and a
total 5% decrease of 10W⋅K−1 is included.
In this study, six types of faults described in Table 2
are considered linked to sensors, process parameters, and
actuators. 
e simulation of these faults corresponds to a
change in the parameters of normal operating conditions.
Fault 1 and fault 2 focus on incipient or abrupt change
of temperature sensor. Temperature is one of the most
important criteria of HEX/reactor process condition, and
the only available measurement is the outlet temperature
of the uids in this work. High temperature usually means
increased risk. However, very low temperature can also bring
along hazards.
erefore, failure in temperature sensor is one
of several faults occurring in the intensied HEX/reactor
system; the detection of sensor faults is of a high priority
level in FDD system. Fault 3 and fault 4 are concerned with
inuence of fouling on overall heat transfer coecient. Fault
3 is related to heavy fouling which results in overall heat
transfer coecient exceeding its domain. Fault 4 refers to
unexpected jump of overall heat transfer coecient. Fault 5
is a very dangerous situation according to previous work [2],
that is, an abrupt switch to zero of uid ow rate; this kind of
faultmay be caused by valve clogging. Finally, fault 6 indicates
an incipient change of uid ow rate. It may be due to the
change of pressure drop across the control valve or bellow-
seal leakage due to leak of the control valve.

e divided parameter intervals for actuator and heat
transfer coecient (UA) are shown in Tables 3 and 4,
respectively. Each process parameter/actuator has its own
limited range due to the physical restriction or eects it
could cause. For example, the actuator used in this work is
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Table 2: Fault scenarios.
Type of fault descriptions
Fault 1 Slow dri of the sensor output; a linear increasing signal is added to the measured output
Fault 2 Abrupt constant bias in sensor; a step disturbance is added to the sensor output
Fault 3 A time-varying bias exceeds domain of overall heat transfer coecient
Fault 4 A positive jump in overall heat transfer coecient
Fault 5 Abrupt switch to zero of actuator of mass owrate
Fault 6 Decrease in actuator of uid owrate
Table 3: Interval bounds for control valve.
No. 1 2 3 4 5휇푎푗 0 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.5휇푏푗 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.5 2.2
Table 4: Interval bounds for overall heat transfer coecient.
No. 1 2 3 4휇푎 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1휇푏 0.5 0.3 0.1 0
pneumatic control valve whose main function is to regulate
the ow rate in a pipe line. 
e ow is set by the position
of the rod, which determines the restricted ow area. 
e
valve opening function 푓 (Ω) indicates the normalized valve
opening areaΩ is the percentage of valve opening and varies
in the limited range of interval [0, 100%], where the value
0 indicates that the valve is fully closed and the value 100%
indicates that it is fully open. Furthermore, fouling decreases
overall heat transfer coecient which is also limited in a
range; value exceeding the normal range indicates higher
fouling. Since in most situations, when a fault is declared, we
care more about the percentage, it varies from its nominal
value, rather than the specic faulty value.Moreover, nominal
value of some parameters, such as ow rate of control valve,
is characterized by percentage of valve opening; y percent
is oen the nominal case with respect to nominal ow rate.

erefore the divided rule is based on variation of
percentage with respect to their nominal values. For instance,
nominal ow rate of utility uid is 152 kg/h.
en 0 in interval
1, Table 3, represents a decrease of 100 percent, which also
means total close of the control valve, and 0.3 means a 70
percent decrease, that is, the ow rate decrease from (152 ∗1) kg/h to (152 ∗ (1 − 0.7)) = 45.6 kg/h. For Table 3, the
rst two intervals indicate decrease of mass ow rate while
intervals 4-5 mean increase. For Table 4, all the intervals
represent decrease of UA due to physical characteristics.
In the following, simulations of two cases of many
faults with dierent types are carried out. Cases 1 and 2
consider one sensor fault with multiprocess/actuator faults;
the obtained results verify the isolation capacity of proposed
methodology. For sensors, there are two observers corre-
sponding to two sensors; observer 1 is based on temperature
sensor 푇푝 to estimate all the states and parameters, while
observer 2 is based on 푇푢. For process parameter of overall
heat transfer coecient (UA) and two actuators correspond-
ing to퐹푢 and퐹푝, each parameter/actuator includes parameter
lters corresponding to intervals in Tables 3 and 4.
4.1. Case 1: One Sensor Fault and One Actuator Fault. In this
case, we consider a very dangerous situation descried in [2].
An abrupt switch to zero superimposes the utility uid ow
rate and a failure on temperature sensor 푇푃 simultaneously.
No utility uid ow rate is considered as the most dangerous
situation according to experiment implemented in [2]. 
is
kind of fault may be caused by valve clogging, which occurs
when the servomotor stem is blocked by an external event
of a mechanical nature. It results in limitation of the piston
movement in both directions, and therefore the ow cannot
drop below a certain value. If this kind of failure could be
identied timely, it can help in better providing predictive
maintenance aids. Details of these faults are as follows:
(i) fault 5: abrupt switch to zero of ow rate of the utility
uid 퐹푢, occurring at time 푡 = 120 s;
(ii) fault 2: a constant bias of −0.5∘C added to output of
temperature sensor 푇푃 at time 푡 = 70 s.
Figures 6–12 report the obtained results. From Figure 6, we
can see that the process uid temperature 푇푃 varies obviously
at time 70 s and 120 s; these variations imply existence of
faults, since both uid temperatures should be stable aer
the transient period. 
en the following task is to identify
the causes of theses faults. First, we have to isolate existing
sensor faults, if there are ones, and provide reliable values
for procedure of process/actuator fault isolation. To achieve
this goal, two observers based on two temperature sensors
are designed to generate two residuals 푟11, 푟22, aimed at
recognizing possible faults on the two sensors. Residual푟11 is generated by observer 1 based on measurement of
process uid temperature sensor 푇푝, while residual 푟22 is
produced by observer 2 based onmeasurement of utility uid
temperature sensor 푇푢. In Figure 7, since only residual 푟11
exceeds the threshold, it is obvious that there is a fault on
temperature sensor 푇푃 at time 70 s and no fault is occurring
on temperature sensor 푇푢. 
en we get one reliable measured
output provided by sensor 푇푢, and we have to estimate a
reliable output for the faulty temperature sensor 푇푝 with the
help of observer 2 based on 푇푢. Noted that there is another
unexpected change on process uid temperature 푇푝 at time
120 s; it means existence of actuator or parameter fault. We
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Figure 6: Outputs of both temperature sensors.
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Figure 7: Isolation residual for sensor fault.
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Figure 8: Temperature output by sensors and observers.
have to utilize the health measurement 푇푢 and recovered 푇̂푝
to identify the root cause of the fault at 120 s.
Figure 8 shows temperature of both uids provided by
sensors and observers; solid curve is the measured value,
output of observer 1 in dot-dash line is based on temperature푇푝, and output of observer 2 in dash line is based on
temperature 푇푢. From the amplied window, we can see that,
at 푡 = 70 s, for process uid temperature 푇푝, the estimated
value in dot-dash line by observer 1 and the measured 푇푝 in
solid line change, and aer that they overlapped. Since we
already know that there is a fault on temperature sensor 푇푝,
these two values become unreliable. However, the estimated
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lters of 퐹푢.
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Figure 11: Fault signature in parameter lters of UA.
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Figure 12: Estimation and simulation under fault situation.
output of observer 2 in in dash line remains stable at 70 s; it is
the estimated process uid temperature 푇푝 based on reliable
sensor푇푢, and therefore it can provide a correct estimation for
the output of faulty process uid temperature푇푝.
enwe can
use estimated output 푇̂푝 in dash line by observer 2 as reliable
output to recover the faulty physical temperature sensor 푇푝.

emeasured output of temperature sensor푇푢, together with
estimated output 푇̂푝 by observer 2, is then fed to parameter
lters for identifying the unexpected change at 푡 = 120 s, thus
recognizing faulty actuator or parameter.
Figures 9–11 are three banks of fault signatures with
respect to two actuators and the overall heat transfer coef-
cient. Figure 9 illustrates fault signature at ve intervals
for utility uid actuator; obviously, at 푡 = 120.01 s, a fault
signature is sent by the rst interval which reports occurrence
of a fault. And according to Table 3, fault in this interval
means that the ow rate of utility uid switches to zero or
the gain of the uid ow rate decreases by 100%. In Figures
10 and 11, the fault signatures retain zero all the time, which
indicates fault-free process uid ow rate actuator and no
higher fouling. 
e isolation results validate the simulated
faults, so the proposed method can correctly diagnose the
case of a sensor fault and an actuator fault simultaneously.
Although the dynamics of overall heat transfer coecient
depend on both fouling and mass ow rate, the proposed
parameter lter is robust to change of uid ow rate and only
sensitive to heavy fouling. Figure 12 validates this assump-
tion; UA sharply jumps to nearly zero at 푡 = 120 s because
of sudden close of utility uid actuator. Both simulation by
model and estimation by observer conrm this change, and
it is clear that variation of UA caused by fouling is within the
acceptable domain; therefore, there is no fault signature sent
by lters of overall heat transfer coecient in Figure 11.
4.2. Case 2: One Sensor Fault, One Parameter Fault, and One
Actuator Fault. In this case, fault 2, fault 3, and fault 6 are
considered in simulation. Details of these faults are as follows:
(i) fault 2: A positive jump of 0.5∘C at 푡 = 60 s is added to
the measured output of temperature sensor 푇푢;
(ii) fault 3: an exponential decrease signal with rate
of −0.01푒0.02푡 is added to the overall heat transfer
coecient, and a fault is assumed once 30% exceeds
the nominal value;
(iii) fault 6: a 20%variation of the process uid ow rate퐹푝
with respect to its nominal value occurred at 푡 = 60 s.

ese three kinds of faults are very oen encountered in real
engineeringworld. Fault 3 simulates higher fouling according
to time, which causes the overall heat transfer coecient to
exceed its domain. It is well known that fouling is a major
reason attributing to the gradual decline in the performance
ofHEX/reactors, and heavy foulingmay cause sever accident.

erefore it ismeaningful tomonitor dynamics of fouling and
raise alarm about a fault caused by higher fouling in a timely
manner. With respect to fault 6, it can be happened due to
bellow-seal leakage of the control valve and so forth. Valve
internal leakage is a common malfunction with industrial
control valves; as a result, the uid ow rate may vary
incipiently. Fault 6 simulates this time-varying change.
Figures 13–19 report the obtained results. Figure 13 shows
the measured outputs of the two sensors.
e temperature 푇푢
varies slowly according to time with a sudden increase at 푡 =60 s, while temperature 푇푝 is time varying during the whole
period. Variations at both temperature proles are abnormal
since they should be stable at a specic level aer transient
time. 
erefore faults are observed; thereaer it is necessary
to isolate and identify these faults.
According to the proposed method, the rst step is to
detect a sensor fault. From Figure 14, it is observed that the
residual 푟22 for sensor 푇푢 exceeds the threshold 0.1 at 푡 =60 s, then a fault signature is sent to verify the occurrence
of sensor fault 푇푢. For sensor 푇푝, its residual is behind the
threshold all the time, so it can provide correct measure
output for temperature of process uid. 
erefore measured푇푝 is reliable and an estimate of faulty measured 푇푢 is
required.
In Figure 15, the development of the performed test
is observed, indicating when a failure in the utility uid
sensor is present and its recovery. As shown in the amplied
windows of this gure, for temperature process uid 푇푝, the
measured output in solid line is adopted. And for temperature
of utility uid푇푢, aer the fault occurs, themeasured value in
solid line and the estimated one in dash line based on mea-
sured푇푢 increase simultaneously and overlapped aer a short
12 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
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Figure 13: Output of both temperature sensors in case 2.
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Figure 15: Temperature output by sensors and observers.
time. 
ese two values are incorrect. In order to obtain an
estimated value to recover the faulty temperature sensor 푇푢.

e temperature value 푇̂푢 estimated by observer 1 measured
based on 푇푝 in dot-dash line can substitute the measured 푇푢
in solid line, allowing the continuous operation of the process
and guaranteeing accuracy of process/actuator fault isolation.
Until now, two reliable values of temperature 푇푝 and 푇̂푢
have been obtained and one sensor fault is isolated. 
en
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Figure 16: Fault signature sent by parameter lters of utility uid 퐹푢.
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Figure 17: Fault signature sent by parameter lters of process uid 퐹푝.
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Figure 19: Estimation and simulation under fault situation.
it is needed to determine whether or not there are actu-
ator/process fault existing meanwhile. Parameter lters are
then triggered to achieve this aim. Figures 16–18 are the three
banks of fault signatures generated by the corresponding
three banks of parameter lters. Figure 16 is fault signature
for actuator of utility uid 퐹푢; no fault is observed in this
case. Fault signatures in Figure 17 aim at recognizing fault at
actuator of process uid 퐹푝; a fault signature is sent by the
fourth interval at 60.5 s which implies a 30% increase with
respect to the nominal value. According to Table 3, lower
bound of this interval is 10% increase and upper bound is
50% increase; then fault containing in this interval indicates a
30% increase. 
e prescribed fault is 20% increase; therefore
there is a 10% estimation error; it can be narrowed by dividing
more intervals. Generally speaking, the smaller the intervals
are divided, the smaller the estimation error is obtained.
However, it should also be noticed that the considerable
parameter sunsets should be distinguishable. Figure 18 shows
the result of isolating jumps in overall heat transfer coecient
(UA); a fault signature is sent by the rst interval at time 푡 =170.4 s; according to Table 4, a fault in this interval indicates
a 40% decrease of UA from its nominal value. From case 1, it
has concluded that UA lter is robust to change of uid ow
rate; therefore the fault signature indicates a fault caused by
important fouling.
In Figure 19, we can see that both simulated and estimated
UA decrease with an abnormal rate from the beginning,
follow with a sharp increase at time 60 s, and then peak at
about 280.6W/K. Aer that, they follow with an abnormal
rate of decrease. 
ese changes indicate fault of both mass
ow rate and important fouling. From Figure 17, the sharp
increase at 60 s is caused by variation of mass ow rate of
process uid. We are interested in the inuence of fouling,
and from Figure 18 the dynamics of UA inuenced by fouling
can be obtained. A fault is declared if 30% decrease of the
nominal value 200W/K happens.We can see that the value of
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UA decreases incipiently, until 170.4 s a fault signature is sent
by interval 1, and a 40% variation is assumed in this interval.
Since the lower bound of interval 1 is 30% decrease to the
nominal value, an estimation error is included. Again, small
interval can help in narrowing the estimated error. However,
for fault of heavy fouling, we just care about the occurrences
of the fault and the speed of raising alarm about the fault
so that more eective measures could be adopted to prevent
severe damage.
5. Conclusions
An integrated approach to fault isolation and identication
for intensied HEX/reactor is proposed. 
e approach is
capable of detecting, isolating, and identifying faults linked
with sensors, actuators, and process parameters.
is consid-
eration suits the diagnostic requirements better since it allows
recognizing root cause of a fault on overall heat transfer
coecient (fouling or uid ow rate). Simulations results
show that the approach achieves satisfactory performances in
terms of detection and diagnosis capabilities for the safety of
HEX/reactor.
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